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I. Introduction
1

London has repeatedly been called the libel capital of the world.
Three factors lie behind the characterization.
First, British


Assistant Professor, Hank Greenspun School of Journalism and Media Studies,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Mr. Bates holds a J.D., cum laude, from Harvard Law
School and also holds his B.A., magna cum laude, from Harvard College. Before
attending Harvard, he was literary editor for Wilson Quarterly. He has consulted for the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
1. E.g., Mark Stephens, England and Wales, in INTERNATIONAL LIBEL AND
PRIVACY HANDBOOK 283 (Charles J. Glasser Jr. ed., Bloomberg L.P. 2d ed. 2009);
Doreen Carvajal, Britain, a Destination for “Libel Tourism,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/20/technology/20iht-libel21.1.9346664.html.
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defamation law substantively favors plaintiffs. By one estimate,
2
plaintiffs win some 90 percent of defamation suits in Britain. Second,
British courts exercise expansive jurisdiction, leading to “libel
tourism,” the practice of filing suit in plaintiff-friendly Britain
concerning statements made in other countries, even though the
3
statements had minimal effect in Britain. Third is the matter of cost.
Defamation cases in Britain are by far the most expensive in Europe,
4
with most of the costs borne by defendants. In some instances,
plaintiffs can file suits knowing that they will be liable for little or
5
nothing in the way of expenses even if they lose.
6
Although the British defamation regime has its defenders, its
critics have grown more numerous in recent years. The campaign for
libel reform “came into play without warning,” according to one

2. DREW SULLIVAN, LIBEL TOURISM: SILENCING THE PRESS THROUGH
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THREATS—A REPORT TO THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
MEDIA ASSISTANCE 19 (Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://cima.ned.org/sites/default/files/
CIMA-Libel_Tourism-Report.pdf. Sullivan cites British media lawyer Mark Stephens as
his source.
3. Libel tourism is the subject of a vast literature. Recent commentary includes
Richard Garnett & Megan Richardson, Libel Tourism or Just Redress? Reconciling the
(English) Right to Reputation with the (American) Right to Free Speech in Cross-Border
Libel Cases, 5 J. PRIVATE INT’L LAW 471 (2009); Travor C. Hartley, “Libel Tourism” and
Conflict of Laws, 59 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 25 (2010); A. R. Klein, Does the World Still Need
United States Tort Law? Or Did It Ever? Some Thoughts on Libel Tourism, 38 PEPP. L.
REV. 375 (2011); Yasmine Lahlou, Libel Tourism: A Transatlantic Quandary, 2 J. INT’L
MEDIA & ENT. L. 199 (2009); Note, Putting the Brakes on Libel Tourism: Examining the
Effects Test as a Basis for Personal Jurisdiction Under New York’s Libel Terrorism
Protection Act, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2457 (2010); Sarah Staveley-O’Carroll, Libel
Tourism Laws: Spoiling the Holiday and Saving the First Amendment?, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. &
LIBERTY 252 (2009); Tara Sturtevant, Can the United States Talk the Talk & Walk the
Walk When It Comes to Libel Tourism: How the Freedom to Sue Abroad Can Kill the
Freedom of Speech at Home, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 269 (2010); Daniel C. Taylor, Libel
Tourism: Protecting Authors and Preserving Comity, 99 GEO. L. J. 189 (2010).
4. See PROGRAMME IN COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW AND POLICY, CENTRE FOR
SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COSTS
IN DEFAMATION PROCEEDINGS ACROSS EUROPE 244 (2008), available at http://pcmlp.
socleg.ox.ac.uk/sites/pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/files/defamationreport.pdf.
5. See CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, PRESS STANDARDS, PRIVACY,
AND LIBEL: REPORT, 2009–10, H.C. 532, ¶ 286 (U.K.); Media Law: Funding, CARTERRUCK, http://www.carter-ruck.com/Media%20Law/Funding.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2012)
(noting that financial arrangements available to some plaintiffs represent “a highly
effective means by which to manage the costs risks of litigation).”
6. E.g., Lord Hoffmann, The Libel Tourism Myth, DAME ANNE EBSWORTH
MEMORIAL LECTURE (Feb. 6, 2010), http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2010/02/the-libeltourism-myth/.
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7

commentator.
In 2008, the United Nations Human Rights
8
Committee urged changes to British libel law. The same year, an
9
Oxford study examined the high cost of British defamation cases. In
2009, English PEN and the Index on Censorship issued a report
saying that British libel law failed to achieve the proper balance;
current law, the report said, “suggests that the reputation of the
10
claimant is more important than the free speech of the defendant.”
The same year, a committee of the U.S. House of Representatives
held a hearing on libel tourism cases, especially those brought in
11
Britain, as they affect Americans. The year 2010 was particularly
12
eventful. A U.S. Senate committee held a hearing on libel tourism.
The Center for International Media Assistance concluded that British
defamation laws “currently pose a serious threat to media around the
13
world.” The Ministry of Justice issued a report critical of British
14
libel law as well as a consultation and response on the costs of libel
15
16
litigation and a report on the costs of civil litigation generally. The

7. Alex Novarese, The Death of Libel—is the Defamation Bill the Beginning of the
End for Libel Lawyers?, LEGAL WEEK, May 12, 2011, http://www.legalweek.com/legalweek/feature/2070231/death-libel-defamation-beginning-libel-lawyers.
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, July 7-25, 2008,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant—
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland at 7–8 ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
GBR/CO/6 (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/jul/uk-unhr.pdf.
9. PROGRAMME IN COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW AND POLICY, supra note 4.
10. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, FREE SPEECH IS NOT FOR SALE: THE
IMPACT OF ENGLISH LIBEL LAW ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 5 (2009), available at
http://libelreform.org/reports/LibelDoc_LowRes.pdf.
11. See Libel Tourism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. L. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009).
12. Are Foreign Libel Lawsuits Chilling Americans’ First Amendment Rights?
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010).
13. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 7.
14. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE LIBEL WORKING GROUP (2010),
http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/libel-working-group-report.pdf.
15. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CONTROLLING COSTS IN DEFAMATION PROCEEDINGS:
REDUCING CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENT SUCCESS FEES—RESPONSE TO
CONSULTATION (2010) [hereinafter MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REDUCING SUCCESS FEES—
RESPONSE], http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/response-conditional-fees-consul
tation.pdf; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CONTROLLING COSTS IN DEFAMATION
PROCEEDINGS: REDUCING CONDITIONAL FEE AGREEMENT SUCCESS FEES—
CONSULTATION PAPER (2010) [hereinafter MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REDUCING SUCCESS
FEES—CONSULTATION], http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/costs-defamationproceedings-consultation.pdf.
16. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF CIVIL LITIGATION
FUNDING AND COSTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES: IMPLEMENTATION OF LORD JUSTICE
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House of Commons Culture, Media, and Sport Committee issued a
report that called the American concerns about British defamation
law “a humiliation for our system” and urged stricter controls on the
17
And all three major political parties
costs of defamation cases.
18
pledged at least to investigate libel reform if elected.
In the view of some commentators, advocates of libel reform in
Britain made a shrewd tactical decision: They emphasized a case
19
involving a nonjournalist defendant.
In April 2008, during
Chiropractic Awareness Week, science writer Simon Singh derided
20
chiropractors in The Guardian. He wrote: “The British Chiropractic
Association claims that their members can help treat children with
colic, sleeping and feeding problems, frequent ear infections, asthma
and prolonged crying, even though there is not a jot of evidence. This
organisation is the respectable face of the chiropractic profession and
21
yet it happily promotes bogus treatments.” The organization sued
22
Singh (but not The Guardian) for libel. The trial judge ruled that
the statements complained of were facts rather than opinions; indeed,
the defendant accused the plaintiffs of “thoroughly disreputable
23
conduct.” The court of appeal reversed the ruling, holding that the
statement was an opinion; it added that Singh’s opinion about
chiropractics “may be mistaken, but to allow the party which has been
denounced on the basis of it to compel its author to prove in court
what he has asserted by way of argument is to invite the court to
24
become an Orwellian ministry of truth.” The organization dropped
the suit rather than seek a further appeal, but the victory cost Singh
25
some £20,000. The experience mobilized Singh and other scientists
26
to push for change, and journalists welcomed their aid. By stressing

JACKSON’S RECOMMENDATIONS (2010), http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/jacksonconsultation-paper.pdf.
17. Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, supra note 5, at 6.
18. Novarese, supra note 7.
19. Id.
20. Simon Singh, Beware the Spinal Trap, GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 2008), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/apr/19/controversiesinscience-health.
21. Id.
22. British Chiropractic Assn. v. Singh, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 350, [10] (Eng.).
23. British Chiropractic Assn. v. Singh, [2009] EWHC (QB) 1101 [13–14] (Eng.).
24. British Chiropractic Assn. v. Singh, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 350 [23] (Eng.).
25. Sarah Boseley, Simon Singh Libel Case Dropped, GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2010),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2010/apr/15/simon-singh-libel-casedropped?intcmp=239.
26. E.g., Simon Singh, How Our Libel Laws Censor Scientists, NEW STATESMAN,
Aug. 12, 2010, at 21; Time for Libel-Law Reform, 464 NATURE 1104 (Apr. 22, 2010);
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the Singh case, advocates for libel reform were no longer mere
“tabloid hacks,” according to Legal Week; now they included
27
respected scholars.
Through the first half of 2011, it appeared that reform was finally
underway. First, in August 2010, President Obama signed into law
the SPEECH Act, which addresses the problem of libel tourism as it
28
affects Americans. Second, a January 2011 ruling of the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg is likely to reduce the costs
29
facing unsuccessful defendants in some British defamation cases.
Third, and most significant, the British government released
30
proposals for far-reaching reforms of defamation law in March 2011.
In a speech, Deputy Prime Minister and Liberal Democrat leader
Nick Clegg declared, “Our aim is to turn English libel laws from an
31
A
international laughing stock to an international blueprint.”
32
committee of Parliament sought public comment on the draft bill. In
the words of Legal Week, “The campaign for libel reform—by
separating itself from tabloid interests in favour of more sympathetic
33
academics—had proved incredibly successful.”
The prospects for comprehensive reform of libel law, however,
took a nosedive in July 2011, as the long-simmering scandal over
phone-hacking by Rupert Murdoch’s News of the World exploded
back into the news. The tabloid had hacked the voicemail of
celebrities and other people in the news. In the most notorious
example, the News of the World had listened to voicemail messages of
Cassandra Willyard, Lawsuit Sparks Call for Libel Law Reform, 15 NATURE MED. 723
(2009).
27. Novarese, supra note 7.
28. Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223 (H.R. 2765) (2010). The law, as will be discussed below, limits
the enforcement of foreign judgments in American courts; thus, it could benefit nonAmericans who have American assets too.
29. MGN v. United Kingdom, [2011] ECHR 66 (Eng.).
30. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, DRAFT DEFAMATION BILL: CONSULTATION (2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docrs/draft-defamation-billconsultation.pdf.
31. Nick Clegg, Speech on Restoring British Liberties (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.lib
dems.org.uk/news_detail.aspx?title=Nick_Clegg:_Restoring_British_liberties&pPK=7781a
555-f93b-4818-b08f-f6382841dc89.
32. Joint Select Committee, Have Your Say on the Draft Defamation Bill,
PARLIAMENT, (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committeesa-z/joint-select/draft-defamation-bill1/news/call-for-evidence/. As this article was going to
press, the committee issued its report. JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT DEFAMATION
BILL, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/interactive/2011/oct/19/medialaw-news
papers.
33. Novarese, supra note 7.
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Milly Dowler, who had been kidnapped in 2002.
When the
voicemail box filled, the hacker allegedly deleted some messages to
make room for more, an action that gave police and Dowler’s family
35
hope that she was alive; in truth, she had been murdered. In July,
Murdoch shut down the 168-year-old News of the World; accepted the
resignation of his CEO, who was subsequently arrested; and withdrew
his bid to take over the satellite broadcaster BSkyB, of which he
36
already owned a minority share.
To date, the British press has largely regulated itself through the
voluntary Press Complaints Commission (“PCC”). The PCC has its
origins in the 1990 report of the Calcutt Committee, appointed by the
Thatcher government to determine how best to prevent invasions of
37
privacy by the British press. The committee recommended a PCC to
38
establish and enforce standards of press behavior. This commission
would have eighteen months to demonstrate that it could function
39
“If it fails,” the Calcutt Committee said, “we
effectively.
recommend that a statutory system for handling complaints should be
40
introduced.”
41
Seven of its
Formed in 1991, the PCC is industry funded.
42
seventeen members are editors. It conducts investigations and has
the authority to compel member news organizations to publish its
adjudications, but any news organization can refuse to do so and
43
withdraw from the PCC’s jurisdiction; the entity has no legal powers.

34. Steven Morris, Police Say Body Is That of Milly Dowler, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21,
2002), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2002/sep/21/stevenmorris1.
35. Nick Davies & Amelia Hill, Missing Milly Dowler’s Voicemail Was Hacked by
News of the World, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jul/04/
milly-dowler-voicemail-hacked-news-of-world.
36. Phone Hacking: Timeline of the Scandal, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 2, 2011),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/phone-hacking/8677065/Phone-hacking-timelineof-a-scandal.html.
37. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 115; Press
Complaints Commission, History, http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/history.html (last visited
Jan. 23, 2012). See generally Adrian Bingham, “Drinking in the Last Chance Saloon:” The
British Press and the Crisis of Self-Regulation, 1989–95, 13 MEDIA HIST. 79 (2007).
38. Press Complaints Commission, supra note 37.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Press Complaints Commission, About the PCC, http://www.pcc.org.uk/about/
governance.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
42. Press Complaints Commission, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.pcc.org.
uk/faqs.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
43. Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, supra note 5, at 115–16; Phone-Hacking
Inquiry: Unanswered Questions, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2011/jul/29/phone-hacking-inquiry-unanswered-questions.
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In early 2011, in fact, the company that publishes The Express, The
Star, OK!, and other periodicals withdrew from PCC funding and
44
jurisdiction. The PCC judges cases were based on adherence to the
Editors’ Code of Conduct, which has been developed and revised by
the Editors’ Code Committee, comprising journalists as well as the
45
director and the chairman of the PCC; no outsiders are represented.
The PCC does not generally involve itself in issues that are or will be
the subject of litigation; and where the injured party does not lodge a
complaint with it, the commission rarely initiates its own
46
David Calcutt, who had headed the Calcutt
investigation.
Committee, assessed the PCC the year after its formation. He
concluded that it fell far short of the independent body recommended
by his earlier report, and he recommended statutory regulation.
47
However, no action was taken.
As the News of the World scandal broke, the Labour leader in
Parliament, Ed Miliband, declared that the PCC is a “toothless
48
poodle” that ought to be replaced by more stringent regulation. The
49
chair of the PCC, Baroness Buscombe, resigned in late July, and the
50
future of the PCC appears to be in doubt. The Prime Minister’s
three-member Privacy Commission said in late July that “[n]ew
regulatory arrangements must be able to demonstrate real
independence from newspaper publishers; ensure an energetic sense
of curiosity by the new regulator[;] and provide effective sanctions to
51
be deployed where there is good cause.”

44. Press Complaints Commission, PCC Statement on Northern & Shell’s Withdrawal
from Press Self-Regulatory System, News Release, http://www.pcc.org.uk/news/index.
html?article=Njg3NA== (last visited Jan. 23, 2012).
45. Press Complaints Commission, Editors’ Code of Practice (Jan. 2011), http://www.
pcc.org.uk/assets/111/Code_of_Practice_2011_A4.pdf; Culture, Media, and Sport
Committee, supra note 5, at 115, 123.
46. Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, supra note 5, at 122, 125.
47. See generally David Calcutt, Freedom of the Press: Freedom from the Press, 9
DENNING L. J. 1 (1994).
48. Nicholas Watt, Press Complaints Commission Is “Toothless Poodle,” GUARDIAN
(July 7, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jul/07/press-complaints-commissioned-miliband.
49. Mark Sweney, PCC Confirms Baroness Buscombe Is to Step Down, GUARDIAN
(July 29, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/jul/29/pcc-baroness-buscombe-tostep-down.
50. The Press Complaints Commission Is Another Victim of the Phone Hacking
Scandal, ECONOMIST, July 8, 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/leviathan/2011/07/rippcc.
51. THE PM PRIVACY COMMISSION REPORT, 18, available at http://www.bbc.co.
uk/blogs/pm/PM_Privacy_Commission_Report.pdf.
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After the Milly Dowler story broke, Prime Minister David
Cameron called for an independent inquiry into “the culture, the
practices and the ethics of the British press,” with the goal of
52
“clean[ing] up the press.” He said he especially wanted the group to
“look at how our newspapers are regulated and make
recommendations for the future,” because “it’s now clear to everyone
53
that the way the press is regulated today is not working.” He added,
“[a]s this scandal shows, while it’s vital that a free press can tell truth
to power, it is equally important that those in power can tell truth to
54
55
the press,” a remark that Prospect magazine found “Orwellian.”
An appeal court judge, Lord Justice Leveson, will lead the inquiry
into press practices, aided by (among others) several journalists,
56
though none from a tabloid.
Polls conducted in spring, before the worst of the story broke,
found that two-thirds of respondents believed phone-hacking was
57
common among British newspapers, and two-thirds favored
58
government regulation of the press. A poll conducted in the second
half of July, after the Milly Dowler revelation, found that more than
half of Britons believe phone hacking and bribery are “just the tip of
59
Even some
the iceberg of the corruption in British media.”
journalists seemed to get caught up in the frenzy of castigating the
press following the phone-hacking revelations. Yasmin AlibhaiBrown of the Independent said on BBC radio that perhaps the
60
When asked about
government ought to license journalists.
licensing, the editor of The Guardian, Alan Rusbridger, said the

52. David Cameron’s Speech on Phone Hacking—The Full Text, GUARDIAN, (July 8,
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jul/08/david-cameron-speech-phone-hacking.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Brendan O’Neill, What Price a Free Press?, PROSPECT, (July 19, 2011),
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2011/07/what-price-a-free-press/.
56. Patrick Wintour, David Cameron Widens Inquiry on Media Regulation to Include
the BBC, GUARDIAN (July 20, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jul/20/
cameron-media-regulation-leveson-inquiry-bbc.
57. Alec Mattinson, Public Critical of News International’s Handling of Phone
Hacking Scandal, PR WEEK, (Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.prweek.com/uk/news/1065989/
Public-critical-News-Internationals-handling-phone-hacking-scandal/.
58. Alec Grice, Voters Deeply Concerned About Phone Hacking, Survey Reveals,
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/votersdeeply-concerned-about-phone-hacking-survey-reveals-2200160.html.
59. Poll: Murdoch Scandal Tip of Iceberg, PRESS TV (July 30, 2011), http://www.press
tv.ir/detail/191557.html.
60. O’Neil, supra note 55.
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prospect made him “anxious,” but that he would be “interested to
61
hear other views.”
As the head of Index on Censorship acknowledged, “This is a
62
tough time to be promoting freedom of expression.” Nonetheless,
the various proposed changes to British defamation law merit review
and evaluation. The News of the World scandal will probably delay
libel reform, but it is unlikely to kill it outright. Current reform
proposals will help set the agenda for future discussions of libel law.
This article begins by summarizing substantive provisions of the
current law, the major criticisms and defenses of them, and the
government’s proposals for reform. Second, it examines issues
related to the costs of litigating defamation cases in Britain, including
the European Court of Human Rights ruling; these issues are not
addressed by the government’s proposed bill. Third, the article
summarizes and evaluates the American SPEECH Act, the factors
underlying it, and its likely impact. Fourth, the article considers the
extent to which the completed and the proposed changes may
ameliorate the perceived shortcomings of British defamation law, and
discusses problems that are likely to endure. The conclusion notes
that once the furor over the News of the World scandal dies down,
reform of long-criticized defamation law in Britain may finally be at
hand.

II. Substantive Issues in British Defamation Law
Although American defamation law is based on British common
law, the two have diverged thanks largely to the American First
Amendment, especially since New York Times v. Sullivan and the
63
The American
introduction of the “actual malice” standard.
approach to free expression has attracted much attention in Britain.
One commentator calls it “the dominant topic of human rights
64
Not all of the commentary has been
litigation in this country.”
61. Id.
62. John Kampfner, Britain’s Media Must Start Policing Itself, FIN. TIMES (July 5,
2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d6e425e-a737-11e0-b6d4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Tt
ROWJtZ.
63. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Under the “actual malice”
standard, a plaintiff who is a public official must show that the defendant either knew that
the assertion was false, or acted in reckless disregard as to truth or falsity. Id. at 279–80.
The Court later extended the actual-malice requirement to public figures. See Curtis
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
64. Stephen Sedley, The First Amendment: A Case for Import Controls?, in
IMPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN,
ENGLISH, AND EUROPEAN LAW 23, (Ian Loveland ed. 1998).
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favorable, though. In a 2010 speech, Lord Hoffmann, who is an
outspoken critic of efforts to change British defamation law, said
Americans believe “that the whole world should share their view
about how to strike the balance between freedom of expression and
65
the defence of reputation.” One British media lawyer has called
66
Sullivan “a defamer’s charter.”
Responding to growing criticism of British law, the British
government released a draft defamation bill in March 2011 and
67
sought comments from the public. In a foreword, Kenneth Clarke,
the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, and Lord
McNally, the Minister of State, wrote of “mounting concern over the
past few years that our defamation laws are not striking the right
balance, but rather are having a chilling effect on freedom of
68
speech.”
This section considers the principal diagnosed shortcomings in
substantive British defamation law, including jurisdiction, and the
69
government’s proposals for addressing some of them. Issues related
to litigation costs, including damage awards, Conditional Fee
Arrangements, and After-the-Event insurance, will be considered in
the next section.
A. Jurisdiction and Libel Tourism

The term libel tourism, according to the Ministry of Justice’s Libel
Working Group, “has been used to cover a number of different
situations where cases have a tenuous link to the jurisdiction,” but it
“usually involves the situation where a person from outside England
and Wales issues proceedings in a court of England and Wales in
70
order to sue another person from outside England and Wales.”

65. Lord Hoffmann, supra note 6.
66. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, PRESS STANDARDS, PRIVACY,
AND LIBEL: REPORT, 2009–10, H.C. 362-2, ¶ 43 (U.K.) (testimony of Rod Christie-Miller,
Schillings Lawyers).
67. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30. The bill was based on the recent criticisms
of British libel law, particularly the English PEN-Index on Censorship report, the Ministry
of Justice’s Libel Working Group report, and the report of the Culture, Media, and Sport
Committee of the House of Commons. Id. at 6.
68. Id. at 3.
69. The article does not address, among others, the issue of privilege. Although the
reform bill proposes to expand the absolute and qualified privileges slightly. See
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 23–27 (they have not been identified as major
problems). See, e.g., CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶¶ 143–
145 (summarizing privileges but making no recommendations).
70. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, ¶ 2.
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Libel tourism occurs because British courts take an expansive view of
jurisdiction. In many instances, courts decide libel cases even though
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant lives in Britain and scarcely
71
any copies of the alleged libel circulated in Britain. British courts
are equally open to accepting online libel cases even where the
allegedly defamatory statement has only a tenuous connection to the
jurisdiction.
Whereas American courts may require that the
statement be “targeted” at the jurisdiction before a court there should
72
accept the case, a British Court of Appeal said in 2004 that a
defendant who publishes on the Internet “has ‘targeted’ every
73
jurisdiction where his text may be downloaded.” By one account, at
74
least fifty cases filed in Britain fall in the category of libel tourism.
To be sure, British courts have declined some cases under forum
75
non conveniens or other discretionary doctrines. Under forum non
conveniens, British courts will decline jurisdiction over a case whose
natural forum is elsewhere unless “the plaintiff can establish that
76
substantial justice cannot be done in the appropriate forum.” In one
case, a British court dismissed a case as an abuse of process where the
allegedly defamatory statements had received just five Internet hits in
77
(One commentator notes the implication: “The media
Britain.
defendant could only hope for poor readership in order to avoid
78
jurisdiction in that foreign country.” ) But “substantial justice” has
proved difficult to demarcate in practice. In one instance, a British
court retained jurisdiction over a case whose natural forum was India,

71. See Libel Tourism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. L. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 134–35 (2009) (response to post-hearing
questions from Bruce D. Brown); SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 17. For an example in which
a British court heard a case brought by one American against another American, see
Lewis v. King, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1329 (Eng.). Although the court in Jameel (Yousef) v.
Dow Jones Co., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 75 (Eng.), said that a court should not hear a case
unless a “real and substantial” tort has been committed in the jurisdiction, the court in
Mardas v. New York Times Co., [2008] EWHC (QB) 3135 (Eng.), said that the circulation
of “[a] few dozen” publications suffices to meet the “real and substantial” standard.
72. Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2002).
73. Lewis, [2004] EWCA (Civ). 1329, ¶ 34.
74. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 52–63.
75. Anna C. Henning & Vivian S. Chu, “Libel Tourism”: Background and Legal
Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 3 (Mar. 5, 2010).
76. Connelly v. RTZ Corp. Plc, [1997] UKHL 30 ¶ 27 (U.K.). See generally ANDREW
BELL, FORUM SHOPPING AND VENUE IN TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION 149–64 ¶¶ 4.38–
4.66 (2003).
77. Jameel v. Dow Jones & Co., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 75. (Eng.).
78. Sandra Davidson, International Considerations in Libel Jurisdiction 15, FORUM
ON PUB. POL’Y, available at http://www.forumonpublicpolicy.com/archivespring08/da
vidson.pdf.
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in part because Indian law would not permit the plaintiff to recover
79
costs. This reasoning would appear to preclude application of the
forum non conveniens doctrine in all cases where the natural forum is
the United States, Japan, or any other country that does not award
80
costs to a successful plaintiff.
Libel tourism has provoked criticism in Britain. English PEN and
the Index on Censorship said that libel tourism has become an
81
“international embarrassment.” The House of Commons committee
said that libel tourism is harming “[t]he UK’s reputation as a country
82
which protects free speech and freedom of expression” and deemed
the American legislative responses (to be discussed below) “more
83
than an embarrassment.”
Several reform proposals have been advanced.
For print
publications, English PEN and the Index on Censorship
recommended allowing defamation suits to go forward only if a tenth
84
of the total number of copies distributed were circulated in Britain.
As for online statements, they would permit British courts to take
jurisdiction of defamation suits only if the defendant had advertised
85
or promoted the article in Britain. Media attorney Mark Stephens
suggested that British courts decline jurisdiction unless at least 1,000
86
copies of a print publication have circulated in the country. A group
of American publishers proposed a threshold of 750 print copies and,
like PEN and the Index on Censorship, recommended liability for
online libel only where a foreign publisher has actively promoted the
87
material in Britain.
The Ministry of Justice’s Libel Working Group developed an
elaborate proposal, under which plaintiffs would either face
additional hurdles before being permitted to serve a claim from
outside Britain, or defendants would be given prior notice and

79. BELL, supra note 76, 157 ¶ 4.55 (citing The Vishva Ajay, [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.
558, 558–60).
80. Id.
81. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 9.
82. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 195.
83. Id. ¶ 205.
84. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 9.
85. Id. Sullivan suggests that until British jurisdictional law is changed, news
organizations configure firewalls to prevent Britons from accessing articles. SULLIVAN,
supra note 2, at 37.
86. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 211.
87. Id. ¶212.
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permitted to challenge jurisdiction before the claim form was served.
It proposed a list of six non-exhaustive criteria for a court to consider:

(1) The level of targeting of a publication at a readership in
this jurisdiction compared with elsewhere;
(2) The level of publication in this jurisdiction compared with
elsewhere;
(3) Whether the claimant has a reputation to protect
specifically in England and Wales;
(4) Whether a significant amount of damage is done in this
jurisdiction compared with elsewhere;
(5) The level of connection of the claimant to England and
Wales (including domicile) compared with elsewhere;
(6) The level of connection of the defendant to England and
89
Wales (including domicile) compared with elsewhere.
The Working Group also proposed that the burden ought to be
on the party claiming British jurisdiction in a defamation case rather
90
than on the party opposing it.
Some British observers have denied that libel tourism represents
a problem and disparaged efforts to address it. In 2010, Lord
Hoffmann criticized the English PEN-Index on Censorship proposals.
He said: “[T]here does not seem to me much logic in saying that, if
you have significantly damaged someone’s reputation in England, it
should be a defence that you have published ten times as many copies
91
of the libel somewhere else.” As for the notion that British courts
ought to accept jurisdiction over online statements only if they were
advertised or promoted in Britain, Lord Hoffmann said: “What does
that mean? Taking out an advertisement in an English newspaper
urging people to read a libellous article on the internet? The idea
92
seems quite unreal.” He said he preferred the Court of Appeal’s
rationale: “if you publish an article on the internet, you are inviting
93
the whole world to read it.”
88. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, ¶¶ 19–37; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra
note 14, Annex D, at 64–65; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, Annex E, at 68–72.
89. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, ¶ 31.
90. Id. ¶ 32. The group noted, however, that it might be imprudent to deprive parties
of substantive rights through procedural mechanisms. Id. ¶ 34.
91. Lord Hoffmann, supra note 6. The Ministry of Justice also noted that 10% might
be considered arbitrary, and pointed out that although The Economist is based in Britain,
only about 6.5% of visitors to its website come from the United Kingdom. MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, supra note 14, ¶ 30.
92. Lord Hoffmann, supra note 6.
93. Id.
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The government proposal addresses jurisdiction against
defendants not domiciled in the United Kingdom, another member
state of the European Union, or a state that is a contracting party to
94
the Lugano Convention. For such defendants, a court will not have
jurisdiction unless “of all the places in which the statement
complained of has been published, England and Wales is clearly the
most appropriate place in which to bring an action in respect of the
95
statement.” The government explained: “This approach is intended
to ensure that, in cases where a statement has been published in this
jurisdiction and also abroad, the court is required to consider the
overall global picture . . . [in deciding] where it would be most
96
appropriate for a claim to be heard.” A British court, however,
might still accept jurisdiction over a case if the plaintiff could not
97
receive a fair hearing elsewhere. This statutory approach would
replace the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the defamation
98
context.
The government did not adopt the proposals that
jurisdiction exists only if a minimum number or percentage of print
copies reach Britain, or if online speech specifically targets Britain.
B. Truth Defense

The defendant in a British defamation action must prove truth
(known as “justification”), whereas in the United States, the plaintiff
99
must generally prove falsity. Several groups addressed the issue of
the truth defense. English PEN and the Index on Censorship argued
that this “misplaced burden of proof” presumes the defendant is
100
In their
guilty, contrary to the norm in other realms of the law.
view, “this, above all, . . . gives libel its unique chilling effect on free
101
speech.” They recommended reversing the burden of proof, at least
in most cases, and requiring the plaintiff to prove falsity or

94. Bill to Amend the Law of Defamation, 2010–11, H.L. Bill [1] cl. 1 (Eng.). The
Lugano Convention concerns the recognition and enforcement of judgments between the
European Community and Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, and Denmark. Id. § 7(4).
95. Id. [1] cl. 2.
96. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 34.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 35.
99. Id. at 14; CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 117;
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:9 (2d ed. 2010); ENGLISH PEN & INDEX
ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 8. A defamation plaintiff must prove at the outset that
the statement is defamatory, that it refers to him or her, and that it was published. See
CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 117.
100. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 5, 8.
101. Id. at 8.
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102

unfairness.
The UN Human Rights Committee suggested that
Britain consider adopting “enhanced pleading requirements (e.g.,
requiring a plaintiff to make some preliminary showing of falsity and
103
The House of
absence of ordinary journalistic standards).”
Commons committee, however, concluded “on balance, that in the
interests of natural justice, defendants should be required to prove
104
The government proposed a
the truth of their allegations.”
statutory truth defense to replace the common-law justification
defense but did not suggest reversing the burden of proof or requiring
105
a plaintiff to make a preliminary showing of falsity.
C. Harm to Reputation

Under current British law, a libel plaintiff need not prove harm to
his or her reputation in order to be awarded damages; the law creates
an “irrebuttable presumption . . . that the publication of a defamatory
106
article causes damage to the reputation of the person defamed.”
English PEN and the Index on Censorship proposed that plaintiffs be
required to demonstrate damage to their reputations in order to
107
Similar to the PEN-Index on Censorship
recover damages.
proposal, the government proposed that a plaintiff make a
preliminary showing that the allegedly defamatory statement “has
caused or is likely to cause substantial harm to [his or her]
108
reputation.” If a plaintiff failed to do so, the judge could dismiss the

102. Id. The groups did not explain why unfairness should be considered a ground for
bringing a suit, and not just falsity. As for exceptions to the proposed rule, the groups
said: “[T]here are cases where it may be impossible for a claimant to provide evidence of
the falsity of an allegation and in these instances the defendant may be required to bring
evidence supporting the truth of what they have written.”
103. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 8 ¶ 25.
104. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 135.
105. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 14. The statutory defense would replace
the common-law one, but case law would remain relevant in interpreting the statutory
defense. See Id. at 14–15.
106. Mardas v. New York Times Co., [2008] EWHC (QB) 3135 [12] (Eng.). See also
CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 118; Stephens, supra note 1,
at 272. This rule is applicable to libel, but in slander, a plaintiff generally must prove
damage to his or her reputation. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 8. Statutory
exceptions to the slander rule include assertions that an individual suffers from leprosy,
the plague, or a sexually transmitted disease, or that a woman is unchaste or adulterous;
the government proposes eliminating these exceptions. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note
30, at 9. The First Amendment, by contrast, requires a plaintiff to come forth with
evidence of “actual injury.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
107. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 8.
108. Bill to Amend the Law of Defamation, 2010–11, H.L. Bill [1] (Eng.).
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109

suit. Such a requirement, in the government’s view, “would provide
extra certainty and help discourage trivial claims,” albeit at the price
110
of “some frontloading of costs” in libel litigation.

III. Higher Standards for Public Officials and Public Figures
Unlike American courts, British courts weigh libel claims by the
same standard regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public official, a
public figure, or a private figure. Indeed, the Supreme Court
Procedure Committee in 1991 expressly rejected a higher standard for
public figures and stated that “it would be quite contrary to the
tradition of our common law that citizens are not divided into
111
The United Nations committee criticized the
different classes.”
approach, saying that Britain “should . . . consider the utility of a socalled ‘public figure’ exception, requiring proof by the plaintiff of
actual malice in order to go forward on actions concerning reporting
112
on public officials and prominent public figures.” In response, Lord
Hoffmann called the UN committee’s “suggestion . . . that failure to
follow American practice may be a breach of this country’s
113
The
international obligation, . . . a remarkable proposition.”
government did not address the adoption of a higher standard of
proof for public officials or public figures.
A. Responsible Publication Defense

Where a defendant cannot prove truth, the only other broadly
applicable defense is one set forth in the 1999 House of Lords case
114
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers. It covers “responsible journalism,”
115
but only if the alleged libel concerns a matter in the public interest.
109. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 9. Dismissing the case would be in the
judge’s discretion and not mandatory; the government did not explain the reasoning
behind this aspect.
110. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 8.
111. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1998] 3 All E.R. 961 (Ct. App.), [13] (Eng.).
112. Human Rights Committee, supra note 8, at 7–8 ¶ 25.
113. Lord Hoffmann, supra note 6.
114. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, [1999] All E.R. (D) 1172 (Eng.). The attorney
who represented Times Newspapers urged the court “to adopt something close to the
Sullivan rule in the United States,” but the court instead adopted a multifactor test. See
also Lord Lester of Herne Hill, testimony to Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation
Bill, (Apr. 27, 2011, at 11–12), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/
Draft%20Defamation%20Bill/110427%20Defamation%20Transcript%20i%20-%20Lord
%20Lester%20Corrected.pdf.
115. See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, [2001] 2 A.C. (H.L.) (Eng.); Jameel v. Dow
Jones & Co., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 75 ¶ 28 (Eng.); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE
SPEECH ACT: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO “LIBEL TOURISM” 3–4 (Sept. 16, 2010),
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Factors to consider in evaluating whether the journalism was
responsible include the following, as set forth by Lord Nicholls of
Birkenhead in Reynolds:
(1) The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the
charge, the more the public is misinformed and the individual
harmed, if the allegation is not true.
(2) The nature of the information, and the extent to which
the subject matter is a matter of public concern.
(3) The source of the information. Some informants have no
direct knowledge of the events. Some have their own axes to
grind, or are being paid for their stories.
(4) The steps taken to verify the information.
(5) The status of the information. The allegation may have
already been the subject of an investigation which commands
respect.
(6) The urgency of the matter. News is often a perishable
commodity.
(7) Whether comment was sought from the plaintiff. He may
have information others do not possess or have not disclosed.
An approach to the plaintiff will not always be necessary.
(8) Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s
side of the story.
(9) The tone of the article. A newspaper can raise queries or
call for an investigation. It need not adopt allegations as
statements of fact.
(10) The circumstances of the publication, including the
116
timing.
A subsequent House of Lords case indicates that the Reynolds
factors are to be applied flexibly; a publisher need not satisfy each
117
criterion.
Case law is divided as to whether this defense applies
118
only to journalist defendants.

available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41417.pdf; Stephens, supra note 1, at 273–74.
The judge, not the jury, determines whether the subject matter of the publication was in
the public interest. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 38.
116. Reynolds, [2001] 2 A.C. (H.L.) (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead).
117. Jameel v. Wall Street Journal [2006] UKHL 44 (appeal taken from Eng.).
118. Compare Kearns v. General Counsel of the Bar, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 331, ¶ 8
(Eng.) (stating that the defense is limited to the mass media), with Seaga v. Harper, [2008]
UKPC 9 (Eng.) (stating that the defense applies generally).
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The House of Commons committee called Reynolds “a defence of
last resort, first because it will only be used by defendants who are
unable to prove that their facts are correct, and second because it
119
transfers scrutiny to the journalistic process.” English PEN and the
Index on Censorship referred to the Reynolds defense as “probably
the most significant development in libel law” during the preceding
120
decade, but they advocated clarifying that it extends beyond
121
Some international nongovernmental organizations
journalism.
(“NGOs”) objected to the recommendation that authors get
comments from the individual whom a publication criticizes, in part
122
for fear that he or she may seek an injunction to stop publication.
Media attorney Mark Stephens noted that mounting a Reynolds
123
defense can be expensive, costing from £100,000 to £200,000. The
House of Commons committee recommended consideration of
124
making the Reynolds factors part of a statutory defense. Stephens,
among others, however, opposed the idea of codifying Reynolds in
125
statutory form.
The draft bill would place the gist of the Reynolds defense on
statutory ground, as the House of Commons committee
recommended and Stephens opposed. The government would also
rename the defense from “responsible journalism” to “responsible
126
publication on [a] matter of public interest.” Doing so would clarify
that it applies to NGOs and others as well as to journalists, as English
PEN and the Index on Censorship advocated. The defense would
127
apply equally to assertions of fact, inference, and opinion. The draft
bill does not define what constitutes a matter of the public interest.
The government explained:

119. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 157.
120. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 5.
121. Id. at 9.
122. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, ¶ 69; id., Annex F, at 73.
123. Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, supra note 66, at 246 (testimony of Mark
Stephens, Senior Member, Intellectual Property and Media, Finer Stephens Innocent
LLP). See also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 24 (stating that “[r]egional media
editors often have limited budgets and therefore see Reynolds as a defence of last
resort.”).
124. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 162, 163.
125. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 66, at 246 (testimony of
Mark Stephens, Senior Member, Intellectual Property and Media, Finer Stephens
Innocent LLP). See also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, ¶¶ 70–73. Instead of
codifying Reynolds, the Ministry of Justice’s Libel Working Group discussed the
possibility of a statutory public-interest defense in addition to Reynolds. Id. ¶¶ 75–82.
126. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 10.
127. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 12.
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We believe that this is a concept which is well-established in
the English common law and that in view of the very wide
range of matters which are of public interest and the
sensitivity of this to factual circumstances, attempting to
define it in statute would be fraught with problems. Such
problems include the risk of missing matters which are of
public interest resulting in too narrow a defence and the risk
of this proving a magnet for satellite litigation adding to costs
128
in relation to libel proceedings.
As for what distinguishes a responsible publication from an
irresponsible one, a court would consider eight criteria adapted from
Reynolds, holding the list to be illustrative rather than exhaustive:
(a) the nature of the publication and its context;
(b) the seriousness of any imputation about the claimant that
is conveyed by the statement;
(c) the extent to which the subject matter of the statement is
of public interest;
(d) the information the defendant had before publishing the
statement and what the defendant knew about the reliability
of that information;
(e) whether the defendant sought the claimant’s views on the
statement before publishing it and whether the publication
included an account of any views the claimant expressed;
(f) whether the defendant took any other steps to verify the
accuracy of the statement;
(g) the timing of the publication and whether there was reason
to think it was in the public interest for the statement to be
published urgently;

128. Id. at 11. See also Id. at 73–74. The public-interest test in privacy cases evidently
differs from the public-interest test in defamation cases. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd.,
[2002] EWCA Civ. 1373, ¶ 61 (Eng.) (stating that “[w]e do not believe that the same test
of public interest applies to justify publication in these two very different torts”). The
Editors’ Code of Practice, enforced by the Press Complaints Commission, states that the
public interest “includes, but is not confined to: i) Detecting or exposing crime or serious
impropriety. ii) Protecting public health and safety. iii) Preventing the public from being
misled by an action or statement of an individual or organisation.” EDITORS’ CODE OF
PRACTICE, (Jan. 2011), http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/practice.html. The Prime Minister’s
Privacy Commission, in its July 2011 report, found this definition of public interest
“perfectly adequate.” The PM Privacy Commission Report, (July 22, 2011), at 11,
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/pm/PM_Privacy_Commission_Report.pdf.
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(h) the tone of the statement (including whether it draws
appropriate distinctions between suspicions, opinions,
129
allegations and proven facts).
130
Though some had recommended it, the government chose
not to include, as a factor indicating responsibility, the
defendant’s adherence to professional standards, for fear that
“such a provision would create a risk of satellite litigation over
the meaning of the codes and the extent to which they had
131
been complied with.”

B. Fair-Comment Defense

The British fair-comment defense is analogous to the opinion
defense in American law, though it covers less ground. The faircomment defense, according to the House of Commons committee,
protects “[a] comment or expression of opinion, based upon (true)
132
Commentators
facts, made in good faith and without malice.”
proffered fewer proposals for refining the fair-comment defense than
for changing other areas of British defamation law. English PEN and
the Index on Censorship recommended expanding the defense so as
to allow “robust debate . . . to flourish” but did not set forth a specific
133
proposal.
The House of Commons committee recommended
134
renaming the defense “comment” or “honest comment” and urged
the government to consider the defense in its review of defamation
135
law, though without advocating a particular reform.
The government proposed a statutory defense of “honest
136
opinion” to replace the common-law defense of fair comment. The
honest-opinion defense would incorporate elements of the commonlaw defense. Under the statutory defense, a defendant would have to
show that the statement at issue was a statement of opinion; that the

129. Bill to Amend the Law of Defamation, 2010–11, H.L. Bill [2] cl. 2 (Eng.). On the
illustrative rather than exhaustive nature of the criteria, see MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra
note 30, at 74.
130. E.g., Lord Lester of Herne Hill, testimony to Joint Committee on the Draft
Defamation Bill, (Apr. 27, 2011), at 30, available at http://www.parliament.uk/
documents/joint-committees/Draft%20Defamation%20Bill/110427%20Defamation%20
Transcript%20i%20-%20Lord%20Lester%20Corrected.pdf.
131. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 12.
132. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 137.
133. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 9–10.
134. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 140.
135. Id. ¶ 142.
136. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 17.
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opinion concerned a matter of the public interest; and that an honest
person could have held the opinion on the basis either of a fact that
existed at the time of publication, or a privileged statement (such as a
Parliamentary report) published before the defendant’s statement at
137
The government suggested some ambivalence over the
issue.
138
public-interest test.
The government chose “a fact” in the third
provision advisedly, “so that any relevant fact or facts will be enough
and it will not be necessary for the defendant to prove the truth of
every single allegation of fact set out in the statement complained
139
But the fact must have existed at the time of publication; a
of.”
defendant’s good-faith but erroneous belief would not be eligible for
140
the defense. In addition, the defense would be inapplicable if the
plaintiff demonstrated that the defendant did not in fact hold the
141
opinion that was published. In this regard, the test is both objective
(asking whether an “honest person” could have held the opinion
based on a fact or a privileged statement) and subjective (asking
142
whether the defendant actually did hold the opinion).
C. Multiple-Publication Rule

Britain follows the multiple-publication rule, under which each
143
access to an article can represent a new libel. British common law
holds that each publication of defamatory material gives rise to a new
cause of action, which is subject to its own statute-of-limitations
period. The rule originated in the 1849 case Duke of Brunswick v.
Harmer, in which the Duke sued for libel after he purchased (through
his servant) a copy of a seventeen-year-old newspaper that defamed
144
him and then brought a libel action. The rule can render the one-

137. Bill to Amend the Law of Defamation, 2010–11, H.L. Bill [4] (Eng.).
138. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 20.
139. Id. at 20–21.
140. Id. at 21.
141. Bill to Amend the Law of Defamation, 2010–11, H.L. Bill [4] cl. 5 (Eng.). This
provision does not apply where the defendant published a statement made by another
person, unless the defendant knew or ought to have known that the other person did not
hold the opinion. Id. [4] cl. 6.
142. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 21–22.
143. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 81, ¶¶ 39–40; CULTURE, MEDIA,
AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶¶ 218–222; CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT
COMMITTEE, supra note 66, at 16 (testimony of Keith Mathieson, Reynolds Porter
Chamberlain LLP); JOSHUA ROZENBERG, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 204 (2004);
SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 18–19.
144. Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, [1849] 14 Q.B. 185 (Eng.). The case is discussed
in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, ¶ 41; CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT
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year statute of limitations meaningless, especially for material in
online archives, although the European Court of Human Rights did
say that the passage of “a significant lapse of time” might violate the
145
European Convention on Human Rights.
Several commentators advocated a single-publication doctrine,
146
matching the approach taken by American law. English PEN and
the Index on Censorship recommended abolishing the Duke of
147
Brunswick rule and adopting the single-publication rule.
A
majority of the Ministry of Justice’s Libel Working Group favored a
single-publication rule for material republished by the original
148
The House of Commons committee recommended a
publisher.
single-publication rule with a one-year limitation period, which could
be extended if the plaintiff could prove that he or she “could not
149
reasonably have been aware of the existence of the publication.”
Even after the expiration of the limitation period, under the
committee’s proposal, a plaintiff could seek a court order requiring
150
the defendant to correct the defamatory statement.
In its proposal, the government said, “We do not believe that the
151
current position . . . is suitable for the modern internet age.”
It
recommended adopting the single-publication rule, but with two
provisos. First, as the House of Commons committee suggested, a
court would have the discretion to permit a plaintiff to bring a suit
152
after passage of the limitation period. Second, the rule would not
apply if the original material was republished by another party, or if
“the manner of publication was otherwise materially different from
153
first publication.”

COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 216; ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note
10, at 8; and SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 18.
145. Times Newspapers v. United Kingdom, [2009] EMLR 14 (Eng.).
146. On the American rule, see Mitan v. Davis, 243 F. Supp. 2d 719, 721–22 (W.D. Ky.
2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 557A (1977).
147. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 9.
148. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, ¶¶ 53–54. The group divided on how to
treat republication by a different publisher.
149. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 230.
150. Id. ¶ 230.
151. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 30.
152. Id. at 30.
153. Id. at 31–32. The difference in text would have to be substantial; the singlepublication rule would apply where the republished statement is “the same or substantially
the same.” The government opted to leave it to courts to determine the boundaries of
“substantially the same.” In addition, “manner of publication” might extend to
circumstances where a narrowly published statement is made much more broadly or
readily available, as when a website takes material that previously required several clicks
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IV. Jury Trials
Currently, statutes provide for defamation cases to be heard by
juries on the motion of any party, “unless the court considers that the
trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or
any scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be
154
made with a jury.” Parties to libel cases generally do not seek jury
155
trials.
Jury trials are otherwise unavailable in most British civil
156
proceedings. Some members of the Libel Working Group criticized
jury trials in defamation cases. According to the group’s report,
“[D]ifficulties had been experienced in juries considering issues
relating to the Reynolds guidelines because of the range and
complexity of the issues requiring determination as questions of
157
fact.”
In addition, jury trials can last longer and cost more than
158
Other members of the group, however, argued that
bench trials.
jury trials represent an important safeguard of individuals’
159
reputations.
The government concluded that the availability of jury trials
160
impedes the resolution of disputes before trial.
Accordingly, the
161
draft bill removes the presumption in favor of jury trials. A judge
162
could still order a jury trial where the interests of justice require it.
The draft bill does not set forth criteria for when jury trials may be

to access and posts it on the home page. One group proposed that the defamation bill
insulate from liability (i) entities that make extant hard-copy publication archives
available online, and (ii) online publishers that require subscriptions for new issues but
make older issues available for free after a specified time. Libel Reform Campaign,
Evidence Submitted to the Scrutiny Committee of the Draft Defamation Bill, (May 25,
2011,), available at http://www.libelreform.org/news/494-libel-reform-campaign-evidence-toscrutiny-committee.
154. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 36. On the division of labor between
judge and jury in a defamation trial, see MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, Annex I, at
85.
155. Lord Lester of Herne Hill, testimony to Joint Committee on the Draft
Defamation Bill, (Apr. 27, 2011), at 36, available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/
joint-committees/Draft%20Defamation%20Bill/110427%20Defamation%20Transcript%
20i%20-%20Lord%20Lester%20Corrected.pdf.
156. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 36. Jury trials are available only in civil
cases over false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and fraud. Id.
157. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, ¶ 93.
158. Id. ¶ 92.
159. Id. The group also discussed and generally supported the idea of having
defamation cases heard by specialist judges. Id. ¶¶ 114–115.
160. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 4.
161. Bill to Amend the Law of Defamation, 2010–11, H.L. Bill [8] (Eng.).
162. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 37.
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appropriate; the government instead invited comment on whether the
163
bill ought to do so.
A. Corporate Plaintiffs

Currently, corporations can sue for defamation on the same basis
164
English PEN and the Index on Censorship
as individuals.
recommended that corporations and associations not be permitted to
bring defamation suits unless they could prove malicious falsehood;
165
The
they would exempt small companies from this restriction.
government invited public input on restricting the ability of
corporations to sue for defamation but did not advance any
166
proposals.
B. Forestalling or Abbreviating Trials

Libel trials can be long and costly, as will be discussed in further
detail below. An extant Pre-Action Protocol encourages alternativedispute resolution (“ADR”); a judge can consider whether the ADR
167
A judge, however,
procedure was exercised in determining costs.
168
cannot make ADR mandatory.
English PEN and the Index on
Censorship advocated three steps to avoid or shorten trials in
defamation cases. First, plaintiffs ought to have to submit to
169
Second,
mediation and binding arbitration before bringing a suit.
defendants ought to be able to resolve challenges by issuing
declarations of falsity, which “would allow redress to injured parties
170
and require minimum involvement of lawyers.” Third, special libel
tribunals should determine the meaning of the statements at issue and

163. Id.at 37–38. Lord Lester, whose earlier bill provided much of the framework of
the government’s bill, said that “[w]e have found it very difficult to articulate any criteria
because it is very hard to think of any sensible way of doing it.” Lord Lester of Herne
Hill, testimony to Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, (Apr. 27, 2011), at 37,
available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/Draft%20Defamation
%20Bill/110427%20Defamation%20Transcript%20i%20-%20Lord%20Lester%20
Corrected.pdf.
164. See CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶¶ 164–178.
165. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 10. Although they do
not define how small a company would have to be in order to sue for defamation, they
note that Australia has introduced a law barring firms with more than ten employees from
filing such suits.
166. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 6, 40–56. On corporations’ defamation
suits, see CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶¶ 164–178.
167. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, Annex H, at 84.
168. Id.
169. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 9.
170. Id. See also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, ¶ 112.
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171

establish the fair-comment defense early in the litigation. The Libel
Working Group discussed these three proposals but did not reach a
172
consensus.
The government solicited comments on improving
173
mechanisms for summary judgments but advanced no proposals.
C. Appellate Review of Defamation Judgments

British appellate courts defer substantially to trial courts in
defamation cases, by contrast to the United States, where appellate
courts closely examine facts as well as law and overturn nearly three174
Advocates of libel
quarters of adverse defamation judgments.
reform in Britain did not discuss appellate review of defamation
judgments though, and the government’s draft bill does not address
the topic.

V. Cost Issues in British Defamation Law
According to the House of Commons committee, “[L]ibel cases
175
are notoriously expensive.” Costs of libel litigation in Britain are by
176
far the highest in Europe. The draft bill does not directly address
matters related to costs, though the foreword to the bill does note
that “simplify[ing] and clarify[ing] the law and procedures” may
177
The
reduce the length of litigation and the attendant costs.
government intends to present proposals related to the funding of
178
civil litigation at some future date.
A. Damages

Defamation damages are not formally capped, though a £200,000
compensatory award from 2002 is generally considered to represent
171. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 9. Similarly, the
House of Commons committee recommended the use of preliminary hearings to
determine whether a statement bears a defamatory meaning. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND
SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 129.
172. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 36–37. The working group also discussed
changing pleading requirements in defamation cases. Id. ¶¶ 101–107.
173. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 6, 40–56.
174. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984); Libel Tourism:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. L. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 19 (2009) (statement of Bruce D. Brown), http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:47316.pdf.
175. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 236.
176. See PROGRAMME IN COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW AND POLICY, supra note 4, at
187; CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 66, at 244 (testimony of
Charmian Gooch, Director, Global Witness).
177. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 3–4.
178. Id. at 3–4, 53.
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179

the maximum amount recoverable. English PEN and the Index on
Censorship took issue with damages in British defamation suits. They
wrote that “[t]he chief remedy . . . should be an apology, not financial
reward.” Accordingly, they recommended capping damages at
£10,000 unless the plaintiff could prove material damage, such as lost
180
earnings.
In response, Lord Hoffmann called this proposal “very
silly,” because damages are intended not merely to compensate the
plaintiff, but also to “deter the media from irresponsible
181
His statement is somewhat misleading, as
journalism.”
compensatory damages are not intended to punish the defendant;
punitive damages, which are rarely awarded in British defamation
182
cases, perform that function. In Lord Hoffmann’s view:
[A] limit of £10,000 on damages will be wholly ineffectual. If
a newspaper is willing to bid a quarter of a million pounds for
the story of a footballer’s mistress, they are unlikely to be
deterred by the prospect of having to pay £10,000 if a story
183
that sells papers turns out to be a libel.
In a paper presented in 2010, Alastair Mullis of the University of
East Anglia and Andrew Scott of the London School of Economics
and Political Science proposed a two-track system for libel
184
litigation. Most cases would be handled through a streamlined and
less costly process, which would seek above all to determine and
publicize the truth. The principal remedy would be a correction,
apology, declaration of falsity, or right of reply from the media
185
organization. Damages for psychological harm resulting from harm
186
to one’s reputation would be capped at £10,000. No other damages

179. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 122. Since the mid1990s, judges have instructed juries on the range of reasonable damage awards; previously,
awards were substantially higher. Id. Out-of-court settlements do sometimes exceed that
amount. Id. ¶ 123.
180. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 8.
181. Lord Hoffmann, supra note 6.
182. See CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 124.
183. Lord Hoffmann, supra note 6.
184. Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, Reframing Libel: Taking (All) Rights Seriously
and Where It Leads, paper presented at Symposium on Reframing Libel, City University
of London, (Nov. 4, 2010), http://reframinglibel.com/2011/03/17/reframing-libel-taking-allrights-seriously-and-where-it-leads/.
185. Id. at 24–25.
186. The European Court of Human Rights has construed Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which addresses privacy, to protect reputation as well. Id.
at 8–9 & n.12.
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would be available. The truth and opinion defenses would remain,
but not the Reynolds defense, because the focus would be on judging
187
accuracy rather than professionalism.
The second track, with
greater damages and the Reynolds defense, would be available only
188
for the most serious or damaging libels.
B. “Success Fees” and After-the-Event Insurance

Major reasons for the high cost of defamation litigation in Britain
are Conditional Fee Arrangements (“CFAs”) and After-the-Event
(“ATE”) insurance. A plaintiff’s lawyer who agrees to a CFA
receives nothing if the client loses, but full reimbursement plus a
“success fee” if the client prevails, paid by the other side—an
189
arrangement unique in the United Kingdom, amongst the world.
CFAs were first envisioned by section 58 of the Courts and Legal
Services Act 1990 and then implemented by the Conditional Fee
190
Under the Conditional Fee Agreements
Agreements Order 1995.
Order 1998, CFAs were available in all litigation other than criminal
191
and family proceedings. The Access to Justice Act 1999, which took
192
effect in 2000, allowed winning plaintiffs to recover success fees.
Success fees were capped at 100 percent of base fees by the
193
Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2000.
The hope was that
success fees would encourage lawyers to accept weaker cases that
they might not otherwise take, and thereby “create the opportunity
for everyone, rich and poor alike, to go to court regardless of their
194
financial position,” a government representative said in 1998.
Although they were created to help less wealthy litigants find
representation for court cases, CFAs have no means test; now, they
are a favorite tool of well-off litigants such as the model Naomi

187. Id. at 21.
188. Id. at 25.
189. See CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 236;
PROGRAMME IN COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW AND POLICY, supra note 4, at 161;
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 25; Lord Justice Jackson, Lord Justice Jackson’s
Response to Ministry of Justice Consultation Paper CP 13/10, (Nov. 29, 2010), at 2,
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Consultations/jackson-lj-civil-litresponse.pdf. Although CFAs and success fees are theoretically available to both sides in
litigation, defendants rarely use them. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 4; Culture,
Media, and Sport Committee, supra note 5, ¶ 291.
190. MGN v. United Kingdom, app. no. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2011), ¶ 90 (Eng.).
191. Id.
192. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 11, 19.
193. Id. at 19.
194. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 251.
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195

Campbell.
Due in part to success fees, the losing party’s fees for
196
lawyers can dwarf the damage award. In one case, the Mail on
Sunday paid a plaintiff more than £500,000 atop a damage award of
197
just £5,000. In the Campbell case, to be discussed below, the Mirror
was ordered to pay £3,500 in damages and over £1 million in
Campbell’s legal fees, including success fees covering parts of the
198
litigation.
Along with success fees, the costs for unsuccessful defendants can
be magnified by ATE insurance purchased by plaintiffs. If the
plaintiff loses the case, the ATE insurance pays the defendant’s legal
199
costs that the plaintiff would otherwise be obligated to pay.
The
insurance company generally charges no premium in those
circumstances, but a plaintiff who wins can recover the cost of the
ATE premium from the defendant, along with legal fees (including a
200
success fee) and damages. The premiums for ATE insurance can be
201
In this
costly—as much as £68,000 for £100,000 of coverage.
fashion, some plaintiffs can file defamation suits virtually for free,
with the defendant liable for potentially hefty costs as well as
202
damages.
The costs of defamation litigation can pressure defendants into
settling cases, even relatively weak ones. Reuters once got sued for
saying that a particular tennis player had the worst record in the
203
sport. The player had a CFA. Reuters was eager to defend based

195. Id. ¶ 290; CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 66, at 14
(testimony of Marcus Partington, Chairman, Media Lawyers Association).
196. Libel Tourism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. L. of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 158–59 (2009) (response to post-hearing
questions from Laura R. Handman), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:47316.pdf.
197. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 239. The total
amount paid includes the VAT. Id.
198. MGN v. United Kingdom, app. no. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2011), ¶ 56.
199. ATE insurance is not obligatory for a party with a CFA agreement. See MGN v.
United Kingdom, app. no. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2011), ¶ 95. But it is common.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 30. Like CFAs, ATE insurance is available to
both parties in litigation but generally is employed only by plaintiffs.
200. See MGN, ¶ 92; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 30–31; CULTURE,
MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 304; PROGRAMME IN COMPARATIVE
MEDIA LAW AND POLICY, supra note 4, at 11 & n.18. The Access to Justice Act 1999
made ATE premiums, along with CFA success fees, recoverable from losing defendants.
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 30.
201. Culture, Media, and Sport Committee, supra note 5, ¶ 287.
202. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 25; CARTER-RUCK, supra note 5.
203. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 66, at 13 (testimony of
Keith Mathieson, Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP).
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on truth, attorney Keith Mathieson told the House of Commons
204
committee, but felt obliged to settle. In light of the plaintiff’s CFA,
losing this “comparatively unimportant libel case,” he said, could
205
have cost Reuters £1.2 million.
In December 2009, Lord Justice Jackson considered CFAs and
206
ATE insurance in a 557-page report on civil litigation costs.
He
found that plaintiffs’ costs increased starkly if they used CFAs and
thus were not generally responsible for paying those costs. Plaintiffs’
legal fees totaled as much as 203% of damage awards in cases using
CFAs, whereas the fees came to around half of damage awards in
207
non-CFA cases. Lord Justice Jackson diagnosed four shortcomings
in the CFA system. First, CFAs ought to have a means test rather
208
than being available to all plaintiffs, regardless of wealth. He wrote,
“The present regime provides protection against adverse costs, but it
is in no way targeted upon those claimants who need such
209
protection.” Second, plaintiffs employing CFAs have no incentive
to rein in litigation costs, because they will not be responsible for
210
paying them. Third, as in the Reuters case, “the costs consequences
of the recoverability rules can be so extreme as to drive opposing
parties to settle at an early stage, despite having good prospects of a
211
Finally, the CFA regime may have the sole
successful defence.”
effect of helping litigants with especially strong cases get into court;
212
attorneys may continue to decline weaker cases.
Lord Justice
Jackson wrote, “[T]he CFA regime . . . presents the opportunity to
cherry pick. If lawyers succumb to that temptation, they will greatly
increase their own earnings and they will do so in a manner which is
213
One firm prevails in some 98% of CFA cases it
entirely lawful.”

204. Id. at 13
205. Id. at 13
206. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT
(2009).
207. Id. ¶ 2.20.
208. Id. ¶¶ 4.3–4.6.
209. RUPERT M. JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS 326 (2010). MGN
raised the same argument before the European Court. See MGN v. United Kingdom, app.
no. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2011), ¶ 167.
210. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 206, at 110–11. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 16, at 20.
211. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 206, at 111.
212. Id. at 111.
213. Id. See also CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 295
(referring to “the inevitability of cherry picking”).
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214

brings, according to Lord Justice Jackson. Terming the recoverable
success fees “the worst possible way to tackle the problem of funding
215
litigation,” he recommended that unsuccessful defendants no longer
be required to pay success fees and ATE insurance premiums to
216
To help prevailing plaintiffs pay their
prevailing plaintiffs.
attorneys’ success fees, he recommended increasing damage awards
217
by 10%.
The Ministry of Justice issued a follow-up report that
endorsed many of Lord Justice Jackson’s diagnoses and
218
prescriptions.
Several other critics of the British libel system have viewed CFA
success fees as a substantial hindrance. The UN Human Rights
219
Committee urged Britain to reconsider success fees. The Ministry
of Justice proposed capping success fees at 10% as an interim
measure, while the government considers Lord Justice Jackson’s
220
The House of Commons Culture,
farther-reaching proposals.
Media, and Sport Committee recommended against means-testing
CFAs—doing so “would be likely to result in access to justice being
limited to the extremely poor and the super rich,” the committee
221
said —but urged that losing defendants be liable only for 10%
success fees (the plaintiff might agree to be liable for an additional
222
success fee).
The committee also recommended that ATE

214. Lord Justice Jackson, supra note 189, at 3.
215. Id. at 5. He similarly judged recoverable ATE premiums “about the most
inefficient and expensive form of one way costs shifting that it is possible to devise.” Id. at
6 (footnote omitted).
216. Id. at 7.
217. Id. at 9.
218. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 7, 15. The ministry did recommend
allowing plaintiffs to recover a 10% success fee, calculated on the basis of the total damage
award, rather than increasing damage awards themselves. Id. at 37. Lord Justice Jackson
wrote that he “strongly oppose[d]” the change and believed that it would “undermin[e]
the whole structure of my reforms.” Lord Justice Jackson, supra note 189, at 8.
219. See HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, supra note 8, at 7–8 ¶ 25 (urging Britain to
“consider . . . limiting the requirement that defendants reimburse a plaintiff’s lawyers[’]
fees and costs regardless of scale, including Conditional Fee Agreements and so-called
‘Success Fees,’ especially insofar as these may have forced defendant publications to settle
without airing valid defences.”).
220. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 5. The Ministry subsequently proposed
the 10% cap to Parliament. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, REDUCING SUCCESS FEES—
RESPONSE, supra note 15, at 17–18 (2010). The government, however, did not pursue the
proposal further in the period leading to the April 2010 general election. See MGN v.
United Kingdom, app. no. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2011), ¶ 120.
221. CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 292.
222. Id. ¶ 307.
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223

premiums be made nonrecoverable. English PEN and the Index on
Censorship advocated eliminating success fees, capping the legal fees
that losing defendants must pay, and making ATE premiums
224
nonrecoverable.
C. Success Fees and the Naomi Campbell Case

A high-profile privacy case has cast doubt on the future of success
fees in Britain. On February 1, 2001, the Mirror, a London tabloid,
225
published the front page headline “Naomi: I am a drug addict.”
The article said that Naomi Campbell was attending meetings of
Narcotics Anonymous “in a courageous bid to beat her addiction to
226
It featured surreptitiously taken photos of her
drink and drugs.”
227
The Mirror’s
outside the Narcotics Anonymous meeting place.
initial coverage was sympathetic, but after Campbell threatened to
sue for invasion of privacy (known as breach of confidence in
Britain), the newspaper changed its tone and called the model
228
“[p]athetic” and “whing[ing].”
Campbell filed suit. She conceded that the newspaper was
justified in publishing the facts of her drug problems, in part because
of her past insistence that she did not use illegal drugs; however, she
maintained that the Mirror had gone too far in publishing details of
229
her treatment as well as photos of her outside the meeting place. In
2002, after a five-day hearing, a judge on the Queen’s Bench
concluded that the Mirror had invaded her privacy and awarded her
230
Later that year, the Court of Appeal reversed the
£3,500.
231
The court said: “We consider that the detail that was
judgment.
given, and indeed the photographs, were a legitimate, if not an
223. Id. ¶ 306.
224. ENGLISH PEN & INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, supra note 10, at 10. See also
CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, ¶ 285 (recommending that the
Ministry of Justice consider capping the maximum hourly rates that can be recovered from
losing parties in defamation proceedings).
225. MGN, app. no. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2011), ¶ 6.
226. Id. ¶ 7.
227. Id. ¶¶ 6, 10.
228. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
229. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1373, ¶¶ 9, 35–36.
230. Campbell v. Mirror Group Newspapers, [2002] EWHC (QB) 499 (Eng). Of the
sum, £1,000 was aggravated damages awarded for the Mirror’s “trashing” of her after she
had threatened to sue. Id. ¶ 164. The damages also covered what the judge deemed a
violation of the Data Protection Act. Id. ¶¶ 71–125.
231. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1373 (Eng.). The Court of Appeal
likewise concluded that the Mirror had not violated the Data Protection Act. Id. ¶¶ 72–
138.
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essential, part of the journalistic package designed to demonstrate
that Miss Campbell had been deceiving the public when she said that
232
she did not take drugs.” In 2004, the House of Lords sided with the
233
trial court. By a vote of three to two, the Lords concluded that the
Mirror had invaded Campbell’s privacy by publishing the photos and
234
the details of her treatment.
Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd. was ordered to pay Campbell the
235
nominal £3,500 in damages and a total of £1,086,295 in legal fees.
Although CFAs are rare in privacy cases, Campbell employed one in
the appeal to the House of Lords, but not in earlier stages of the
236
Under the CFA agreement, her solicitors would be
litigation.
entitled to a success fee amounting to 95% of base costs, and her
237
counsel would be entitled to a fee amounting to 100% of base costs.
238
The success fees came to £279,981.
Mirror Group Newspapers appealed the success fees to the House
239
of Lords. The news organization argued that a liability for legal fees
so disproportionate to the actual damages breached Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which provides, “Everyone
240
The House of Lords
has the right to freedom of expression.”
unanimously dismissed the appeal, though some members voiced
241
concern about disproportionate costs. For the second appeal, MGN

232. Id. ¶ 62.
233. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22 (Eng.).
234. Id.
235. MGN v. United Kingdom, app. no. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2011), ¶ 56. MGN
was ordered to pay Campbell’s ATE premium as well; the company did not challenge it.
See id. ¶ 198.
236. Id. ¶ 56. See Tim Lowles, The Consequences of MGN United v. The UK: Does the
CFA Regime Really Need Reforming?, INFORRM’S BLOG, (Jan. 20, 2011), http://inforrm.
wordpress.com/2011/01/20/opinion-the-consequences-of-mgn-limited-v-the-uk-%E2%80
%93-does-the-cfa-regime-really-need-reforming-tim-lowles/ (stating that “it is rare for
privacy claims to be conducted on a CFA with their use being much more prevalent in
personal injury or defamation claims.”).
237. MGN, app. no. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2011), ¶ 56.
238. Id.
239. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2005] UKHL 61 (Eng.). While the appeal was pending,
Campbell’s lawyers agreed to accept reduced fees, totaling £385,000, from MGN.
240. COUNCIL OF EUROP.. European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 10,
http://www.hri.org/docs/ ECHR50.html.
241. See Campbell, ¶ 31. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead:
Faced with a free-spending claimant’s solicitor and being at risk not only
as to liability but also as to twice the claimant’s costs, the defendant is
faced with an arms race which makes it particularly unfair for the
claimant afterwards to justify his conduct of the litigation on the ground
that the defendant’s own costs were equally high.
Id.
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was ordered to pay Campbell £255,536, which included a solicitors’
success fee of £85,096; her counsel did not employ a CFA for the
242
appeal. MGN then sought review by Judicial Taxing Officers of the
costs for the second appeal—thus appealing the costs of its earlier
243
appeal of costs. The Judicial Taxing Officers, who have the power
to adjust legal fees charged to losing parties, declined to disturb the
percentage of the success fee award, though they did reduce the
244
The House of
hourly rates charged by the counsel and solicitors.
245
Lords refused to allow a further appeal.
MGN then sought review by the European Court of Human
Rights. In MGN Ltd. v. United Kingdom, the court reviewed the
history of the Campbell litigation; the laws, orders, and case law
concerning CFAs; and proposals for reforming the CFA regime and
246
other elements that contribute to the expense of libel litigation.
The European Court reasoned that the United Kingdom was entitled
to broad deference (called a margin of appreciation) on social and
economic policies, including means of ensuring access to the courts; it
would not interfere with a legislature’s interpretation of the public
interest in this realm “unless that judgment is manifestly without
247
But regulations affecting freedom of
reasonable foundation.”
expression, at least when they potentially chill reporting on some
matters, are entitled to less deference: “[T]he most careful scrutiny on
the part of the Court is called for when measures taken by a national
authority are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in
248
The court
debates over matters of legitimate public concern.”
emphasized the many criticisms of the CFA regime that had been
raised in Britain, though most of them came after the House of Lords
249
decision on Campbell’s success fees. After reviewing Lord Justice

242. MGN, app. no. 39401/04 (Eur. Ct. H. R. 2011), ¶ 76.
243. Id. ¶¶ 77–79. On the power of courts and their designees to adjust CFA success
fees and ATE insurance premiums, see MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 20.
244. MGN, ¶¶ 80, 96. Campbell’s attorneys ultimately compromised with MGN and
accepted a total of £500,000. Id. ¶ 218.
245. Id. ¶ 81.
246. Id. ¶¶ 1-220. The case is denominated MGN v. United Kingdom because claims
in the European Court are brought against member states. Thus, MGN was suing the
United Kingdom for infringing its Article 10 rights through enforcement of the CFA
success fees. As the court summarized MGN’s argument, “The requirement to pay the
success fees of Ms. Campbell’s lawyers was an interference with the applicant’s freedom of
expression.” Id. ¶ 162.
247. Id. ¶ 200.
248. Id. ¶ 201.
249. Id. ¶ 203.
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Jackson’s critiques of the CFA system, the Court paused over the last
of them, the likelihood that lawyers would cherry pick the strongest
cases, where the odds of recovering success fees were highest. Cherry
picking, the Court said, suggested that “the scheme has not achieved
the espoused aim of ensuring access to justice of the broadest range of
250
persons.” The Court went on to note that a member state’s efforts
to reform a practice do not necessarily mean that the practice violates
the European Convention, but it added:
However, the Court considers that the depth and nature of the
flaws in the system, highlighted in convincing detail by the
public consultation process, and accepted in important
respects by the Ministry of Justice, are such that the Court can
conclude that the impugned scheme exceeded even the broad
margin of appreciation to be accorded to the State in respect
251
of general measures pursuing social and economic interests.
Accordingly, the success-fee requirement “was disproportionate
252
having regard to the legitimate aims sought to be achieved.” In this
respect, the United Kingdom violated Article 10 of the European
253
Convention.
D. The Uncertain State of Success Fees

The European Court did not say what level of success fees would
254
be acceptable, only that fees of 95% and 100% were excessive. The
Court concluded that the government and MGN ought to be given
the opportunity to reach a settlement before it released an order
255
resolving the issue. Accordingly, the legal standing of success fees
remains unclear. Specifically, it is unknown what percentage of fees
is consistent with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Unless the British government changes the CFA procedure
and the level or recoverability of success fees, future litigation before
the European Court may be necessary to determine what is
permissible.

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. ¶ 215.
Id. ¶ 217.
Id. ¶ 219.
Id. ¶ 220.
Id. ¶¶ 218–219.
Id. ¶ 227.
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VI. “Libel Tourism” and the SPEECH Act
British defamation law has had ramifications in the United States
through libel tourism. Under the doctrine of comity, a defamation
plaintiff who prevailed in a British court could—at least in theory—
get an American court to enforce the judgment against the
defendant’s American assets, thereby evading the stringent First
Amendment protections available to defendants in defamation cases
256
American defendants would
brought in the United States.
essentially be subject to British defamation law. Given the British
courts’ expansive approach to jurisdiction, this liability could extend
even to defendants who never set foot in Britain and those whose
publications reached only a tiny audience in Britain.
257
Though it was the subject of law review articles, as well as
258
hearings in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, the
problem of libel tourism was largely hypothetical. In the two cases
where foreign litigants attempted to enforce British libel judgments in
259
the United States, American courts refused to cooperate. In one of
the cases, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that enforcing
such a judgment would conflict with American public policy and the
260
First Amendment. The Congressional Research Service was unable
to point to any instance in which an American court had enforced a
261
British libel judgment.
Nonetheless, the possibility of such enforcement exerted a chilling
effect on some American authors and publishers. In one instance, a
litigant won a default libel judgment against an American author in a
262
British court. Although the plaintiff did not attempt to enforce the
256. On comity, see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202–03 (1859). Many states have
adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962 or the Uniform
Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act of 2005, which incorporate principles
from Hilton. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 75, at 7–8.
257. See sources cited in note 3, supra.
258. Are Foreign Libel Lawsuits Chilling Americans’ First Amendment Rights?
Hearing Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2010); Libel Tourism: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. L. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. (2009).
259. Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1995), aff’d, 159 F.3d 636
(D.C. Cir. 1998); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 259 (Md. Ct. Apps. 1997);
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992); H.R.
REP. NO. 111-54, at 4–5 (2009). Cf. Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder Inc., 489 F.3d 474
(2d Cir. 2007) (declining to enforce French judgment in a copyright case that impinged on
First Amendment rights).
260. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d 230.
261. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 75, at 8.
262. Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156 (Eng.).
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judgment in the United States, the defendant worried that she might
be vulnerable if she traveled to Britain or the European Union
263
countries that enforce British judgments.
In addition, such
judgments, even if not enforced, can adversely affect one’s
264
applications for jobs or loans as well as one’s credibility. In other
instances, American publishers or authors backed down when
265
threatened with libel lawsuits in Britain. A media attorney, Laura
R. Handman, told the House Judiciary Committee, “Virtually every
demand letter we receive these days from a U.S. lawyer is
266
accompanied by one from a British solicitor.”
On August 10, 2010, President Obama signed into law the
SPEECH Act (Securing the Protection of our Enduring and
Established Constitutional Heritage), which bars American courts
from enforcing foreign defamation judgments that fail to comport
267
Specifically,
with the protections of the First Amendment.
American courts are instructed not to enforce judgments unless
either:
(A) the defamation law applied in the foreign court’s
adjudication provided at least as much protection for freedom

263. See Libel Tourism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. L. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) (statement of Rachel
Ehrenfeld). The plaintiff’s lawyer responded that Ehrenfeld had nothing to fear unless
she planned to bring a great deal of money with her: “We abolished debtors’ prisons some
time ago.” Writ Large, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2009, reprinted in Libel Tourism: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. L. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 32, 33 (2009) (statement of Bruce D. Brown). British judgments can be
enforced across the European Union except for Denmark. See Libel Tourism: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. L. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 134–36 (2009) (response to post-hearing questions from Bruce D. Brown).
264. See S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 2 (2010); BELL, supra note 76, at 170 ¶ 4.8081 (2003);
SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 30.
265. See Libel Tourism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. L. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 18–19, 22 (2009) (statement of Bruce D.
Brown); Marc Perelman, Israeli Art Critic Wins Legal Battles, FORWARD (July 4, 2008),
http://www.forward.com/articles/13662/.
266. H.R. REP. NO. 111-154, at 4 (2009) (testimony of Laura R. Handman),
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports&docid=f:
hr154.111.pdf.
267. Pub. L. No. 111-223 (H.R. 2765), Aug. 10, 2010. The burden is on the party
seeking enforcement to establish consistency with First Amendment standards. See 28
U.S.C. § 4102(2) (West 2011). The law also bars enforcement of foreign defamation
judgments (i) where the foreign court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction did not comport
with constitutional due process; or (ii) where the defendant provides an interactive
computer service, unless the judgment is consistent with 47 U.S.C. § 230. See 28 U.S.C. §§
4102(b), 4102(c) (West 2011).
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of speech and press in that case as would be provided by the
first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
by the constitution and law of the State in which the domestic
court is located; or
(B) even if the defamation law applied in the foreign court’s
adjudication did not provide as much protection for freedom
of speech and press as the first amendment to the Constitution
of the United States and the constitution and law of the State,
the party opposing recognition or enforcement of that foreign
judgment would have been found liable for defamation by a
domestic court applying the first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and the constitution and law
268
of the State in which the domestic court is located.
The burden lies on the party seeking enforcement of the foreign
269
judgment.
The law also provides for the party opposing
270
enforcement of a judgment to receive attorneys’ fees, if successful.
In addition, the law provides for declaratory judgments as to the
enforceability of a foreign judgment; here, the burden lies on the
271
party bringing the action for a declaratory judgment.

VII. Assessment
Americans must strive to avoid the parochial belief that foreign
systems of free expression are inferior to the degree that they deviate
from the protections afforded by the First Amendment, and its
272
Nonetheless, even
emphasis on free expression over reputation.
many Britons have found fault with the British system. The
government’s draft defamation bill seeks to give greater weight to
free expression vis-à-vis reputation. As does the European Court of
268. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1) (West 2011). In addition, the court must conclude that the
foreign court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction comported with the requirements of the
due process clause. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(b)(1) (West 2011).
269. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(2) (West 2011). The jurisdictional inquiry and the interactivecomputer provision also place the burden on the party seeking enforcement. 28 U.S.C. §§
4102(b)(2), 4102(c)(2) (West 2011).
270. 28 U.S.C. § 4105 (West 2011).
271. 28 U.S.C. § 4104(a) (West 2011).
272. On the status of the United States as a global outlier when it comes to free
speech, see Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, (Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University Working Paper No. RWP05-021, 2005) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=668543; Kyu Ho Youm, Liberalizing
British Defamation Law: A Case of Importing the First Amendment?, 13 COMM. L. &
POL’Y 415 (2008).
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Human Rights ruling on CFA success fees, with their
disproportionate impact on defendants. The SPEECH Act, of course,
does not alter British law, but it appears to have helped shame the
273
British government into taking action. This section evaluates some
of the government’s most significant reform proposals.
The government’s proposals are salutary in many respects. The
requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate harm to their reputations,
rather than having such harm irrebuttably presumed, will help
prevent plaintiffs from recovering monetary damages (or settlements)
where they have suffered no real harm. Elimination of the multiplepublication rule combined with a flexible approach to the one-year
statute of limitations will give potential defendants some sense of
repose with the passage of time, help ensure that evidence and
witnesses’ recollections are reasonably fresh, and encourage
aggrieved potential plaintiffs to file claims as soon as practicable. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, “[I]f a man neglects to enforce his
rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his
274
example.” Reducing the availability of jury trials will cut costs and
bring defamation cases into line with most civil litigation in Britain,
though it may trouble some Americans accustomed to jury trials in
275
civil litigation. The British government should set forth criteria for
a judge to use in determining whether to order a jury trial. The
decision to omit adherence to professional codes from the
responsible-publication defense is welcome in light of subsequent
developments. Whatever replaces the Press Complaints Commission
may well draw up a professional code independently, rather than,
relying on a code generated largely by journalists as it does now.
Incorporating such an independent code into libel law would create a
new and unpredictable form of press regulation.
In addition, for non-British defamation defendants, reining in the
exercise of jurisdiction will make a substantial difference. (American
individuals and corporations may still be liable for damages in British
276
Critics of libel
defamation suits if they have European assets).
tourism talked of establishing thresholds for jurisdiction, such as a
minimum number of copies of a publication that must circulate in
Britain. The government chose a wiser course of action in leaving

273. See CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 6 (referring to
American concerns about British defamation law as “a humiliation for our system.”).
274. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1897).
275. See U.S. CONST., amend. VII.
276. See S. REP. NO. 111-224, at 10 (2010) (additional views of Sen. Kyl).
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courts to determine whether Britain represents “clearly the most
277
If judges
appropriate place” for the litigation to go forward.
continue to exercise jurisdiction over dubious cases, as sometimes
occurs despite the analogous forum non conveniens doctrine, the
government should revisit the issue, and perhaps add the criteria
proposed by the Ministry of Justice’s Libel Working Group to the
278
law.
For all their strengths, however, the government’s proposals fall
short in six areas. First, the government did not discuss requiring
plaintiffs to prove the falsity of the challenged statement, rather than,
as now, requiring defendants to prove truth. Requiring defendants to
prove truth, rather than requiring plaintiffs to prove falsity, can lead
279
Second, contrary to the
to oppressive and even absurd results.
recommendation of the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
the government failed to suggest a higher standard of proof, such as
actual malice, for plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures.
Given the culture of British tabloids, with their clangorous coverage
of celebrities, perhaps the government was reluctant to raise the bar
for public figures. Even so, a higher standard for public officials
would protect the press’s watchdog function in covering the
government. Third, the proposed reform continues to embody a
public-interest standard, most significantly through codification of the
Reynolds defense as “responsible publication on [a] matter of the
280
public interest.” Although the statute does set forth useful criteria
as to what constitutes responsible behavior on the part of a journalist
or other speaker, analogous to the negligence standard in American
defamation law, the undefined public-interest standard is
problematic. American courts have largely eschewed inquiries into
281
what sort of speech directly advances the public interest.
As
277. Bill to Amend the Law of Defamation, 2010–11 H.L. Bill [7] cl. 2 (Eng.). The
limitation would not apply to defendants domiciled in the United Kingdom, another
member state of the European Union, or a state that is a contracting party to the Lugano
Convention. Id. § 7(1).
278. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, ¶ 31.
279. In a case brought by David Irving, who sued over having been called a Holocaust
denier and an unreliable historian, the defendant had to submit evidence of the existence
of gas chambers at Auschwitz in order to show what Irving had mischaracterized or
disregarded. See generally DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, HISTORY ON TRIAL: MY DAY IN
COURT WITH DAVID IRVING (2005).
280. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 10. The issue arises concerning the
honest-opinion defense too, which also embodies a public-interest element. Id. 20.
281. See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (noting the “difficulty of
forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address
issues of ‘general or public interest’ and which do not”) (citation omitted). But cf.
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commentators have noted, judges are likely to err and potentially
282
constrict the sphere of public discourse. Fourth, the honest-opinion
defense should extend to an opinion based on a good-faith but
erroneous understanding of the pertinent facts. The government’s
proposal covers only opinions based on accurately perceived facts,
leaving those who honestly misconstrue the facts needlessly at risk.
Fifth, appellate courts’ independent review of libel cases, covering
facts as well as law, provides an important safeguard in American
courts. Britain should at least consider such an approach, which the
government has not yet done. Finally, the government’s bill fails to
address the principal sources of high litigation costs in defamation
283
cases, CFAs with success fees and ATE insurance premiums.
Under the European Court of Human Rights ruling in the Naomi
Campbell case, success fees of 95% and 100% cannot continue, but
the task of developing a replacement probably falls to the
284
Valuable reform
government, not to the Strasbourg court.
proposals have been advanced, particularly Lord Justice Jackson’s
comprehensive plan for making CFA success fees and ATE insurance
premiums nonrecoverable. The government is preparing legislation
based on the Jackson proposals, so criticism on this ground may be
premature.
Some other complaints about the draft bill appear overstated.
From one perspective, some critics have argued that codifying
existing case law, as with the Reynolds defense, will simply lead to
more litigation. A lawyer who represents plaintiffs told Legal Week,
“The Defamation Bill will mean five to seven years of many litigants
running up huge legal bills to work out what the various reforms
285
According to this argument, litigation will be
mean in practice.”
necessary in order to establish whether Parliament intended merely

Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (distinguishing “the publication of truthful
information of public concern” from “disclosures of trade secrets or domestic gossip or
other information of purely private concern.”).
282. C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment, 21 SOCIAL PHIL. & POL’Y 215, 264 (2004); Cynthia L.
Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First
Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 49 (1990).
283. In addition, the government failed to address the possibility of ADRs and other
procedures for reaching early resolutions in defamation proceedings. For one such
proposal, see Libel Reform Campaign, supra note 153.
284. MGN v. United Kingdom, [2011] ECHR 66 ¶¶ 218–219 (Eng.).
285. Alex Novarese, A “Laughing Stock” Libel Law No More? The Defamation Bill,
LEGAL WK., May 12, 2011, http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/feature/2070232/laughing-stock-libel-law-defamation.
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to codify case law, or whether it also intended to impose changes.
Lord Hoffmann, an outspoken opponent of libel reform, has said that
287
“there is a case for leaving well enough alone.” But Parliamentary
debates would probably clarify most instances of ambiguity. In
another criticism, Jenny Afia and Phil Hartley of the Schillings Law
Firm argue that the requirement of “substantial” harm to a plaintiff’s
reputation sets too high a threshold: because of the front-loaded costs
of litigating the substantiality of harm, a worthy plaintiff may be
288
But defamation
unable to bring a suit against a media company.
law is intended to compensate plaintiffs for damaged reputations.
Plaintiffs who cannot demonstrate that their reputations have been
harmed should not be bringing suits.
From the other perspective, the Libel Reform Campaign, which is
comprised of English PEN, the Index on Censorship, and Sense
About Science, has argued that the government proposals do not go
far enough. The Libel Reform Campaign continues to urge tight
289
In
restrictions on the ability of corporations to sue for libel.
particular, corporations should have to demonstrate malice or
290
recklessness as well as actual or likely financial harm. In the United
States, the principal issue raised by corporations’ libel suits has been
291
determining whether plaintiffs qualify as public figures. Given that
Britain plans to continue to eschew the public-figure doctrine, the
problem would not arise. The Libel Reform Campaign’s concern
about an imbalance of resources, with wealthy corporations suing
292
middle-class individuals, is best addressed through reducing the
costs of libel suits. The Libel Reform Campaign also believes that the

286. E.g., Jenny Afia & Phil Hartley, Tipping the Balance, NEW L. J., Mar. 18, 2011, at
376; Nigel Tait, A Bitter Pill to Swallow, LEGAL WK., May 12, 2011,
http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/feature/2070224/bitter-swallow-carter-ruck-tacklesdefamation.
287. Afia & Hartley, supra note 286.
288. Jenny Afia & Phil Hartley, Libel Reform: The Proposed Changes, IN-HOUSE
LAWYER (May 4, 2011), http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/media-entertainmenta-sport/9394-libel-reform-the-proposed-changes.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See generally Robert E. Drechsel & Deborah Moon, Corporate Libel Plaintiffs
and the News Media: An Analysis of the Public-Private Figure Distinction After Gertz, 21
AM. BUS. L. J. 127 (1983); Lynn B. Oberlander, Corporate Plaintiffs: Public or Private
Figures?, 16 COMM. LAW. 1 (1998); Norman Redlich, The Publicly Held Corporation as
Defamation Plaintiff, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1167 (1995); Dulele Straughan, Bill Chamberlin
& Carol Reuss, For Corporate Libel Plaintiffs: Life After Gertz, 10 PUB. RELATIONS REV.
47 (1984).
292. Libel Reform Campaign, supra note 153.
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“substantial harm” test—the requirement that a plaintiff show
“substantial harm” to his or her reputation in order to proceed with a
suit—sets too low a threshold, which will allow “trivial and vexatious
293
As an alternative it suggests “serious and
claims” to be brought.
substantial,” albeit with a circular and unhelpful definition:
“substantial in law merely means non-trivial or negligible, while
294
serious means that it is serious enough to bring before a court.”
A. Conclusion

After years of complaints about British defamation law, the
prospects for change suddenly brightened in 2010 and early 2011, and
just as suddenly dimmed in mid-2011. To be sure, important steps
have already been taken. The European Court of Human Rights has
held that CFA success fees of 95% and 100% violate the European
Convention on Human Rights; these success fees, along with ATE
insurance premiums, have contributed significantly to the high costs
of defamation cases in Britain. In addition, the United States has
adopted the SPEECH Act, which bars American courts from
enforcing some judgments in British defamation cases and thereby
reduces the problem of libel tourism.
But the prospects for quick action on the British government’s
proposed reforms of libel law appear to be poor. A government
eager to impose stricter regulations on the press, as is the case now,
will not rush to give the press greater leeway in libel cases. The News
of the World’s lawbreaking has left behind severe collateral damage.
In the long term, however, the British press will live down the
scandal. When it does, the government’s proposals will provide a
valuable blueprint for reform—not thoroughgoing reform, with the
issue of defamation costs as yet unaddressed, but important steps.
For now, advocates of free expression can only wait for the climate to
improve and, like many other Britons, seethe over the wrongdoing of
Murdoch’s minions.

293. Id.
294. Id.

